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         1
               Brad
        Slape passed away on July 16, 1995. 
        His testimony from the April 1991 trial was read into the record
        for this proceeding. (Tr. 648-670) 2       
        Brad Slape
        told the police officers that he thought he knew one of the robbers and
        if they could get him a yearbook he would be able to give them a name. 
        Officer Tolar retrieved a yearbook, State Exh. 3, from Okmulgee
        High School and Brad Slape identified Mr. Hammon. (Tr. 367-370) 3       
        The
        medical examiner, Dr. Ronald F. Distefano testified that the victim died
        as a result of a gunshot wound to the chest. 
        He opined that the victim had been shot three times, twice at
        close range.  (Tr. 405-408;
        State Exh. 1). 4         
        September 9,
        1998 Affidavit of C. Alan Hopewell, Exhibit 3, to Mr. Hammon=s
        Application for Evidentiary Hearing on Sixth Amendment Claims, filed
        in Hammon v. State, F-97-910. 
        Dr. Hopewell=s
        Affidavit, and the remainder of the Application for Evidentiary
        Hearing on Sixth Amendment Claims are incorporated as if fully set
        forth herein and by operation of the Court=s
        Rule 1.13 (F) and 9.7 (D)(1), 22 O.S. Ch. 18, App. 5       
        Trial
        counsel did file a Motion to Strike Bill of Particulars and Declare
        Death Penalty Unconstitutional When Sought Against a Mentally Retarded,
        Neurologically Damaged Defendant (O.R. 468), which the
        District Court denied (6/19/96 Motion Hrg. Tr. at 6-7). 6
              
        In the event
        this Court determines that the evidence and arguments presented in this
        proposition should have been raised and presented on direct appeal,
        Petitioner also requests review of this issue pursuant to 22 O.S. '
        1089 (D)(4)(b)(2), because appellate counsel=s
        failure to present this evidence and argument denied Petitioner the
        effective assistance of counsel.  U.S.
        Const. Amends. 6, 14; Okla. Const. Art. II '
        7, 20. 7       
        E.g., Note:
        The California Initiative Process: A Suggestion for Reform, 48
        S.Cal.L.Rev. 922, 923 (1975) (AThe primary motivation for the initiative process in
        California was the public=s
        desire to counter the lobbyist, the conduit of legislative influence
        exercised by and for economic and other special interests@). 
        A study of three Colorado ballot initiatives found that the
        pro-initiative side began with a commanding lead which diminished during
        the progress of the campaign.  In
        each case, corporate backed opposition forces heavily outspent their
        counterparts.  Each
        initiative was defeated. Mastro, Costlow, and Sanchez, Taking the
        Initiative: Corporate Control of the Referendum Process Through Media
        Spending and What to Do About It, 32 Fed.Comm.L.J. 315 (1980). 
        In a 1981 study of 19 campaigns, the side with corporate
        financial backing outspent their opponents by better than 2 to 1 in 15
        campaigns and won 12 of those. S. Lyndenberg, 
        Bankrolling Ballots: Update 1980, cited in Citizens
        Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. 290, 102 S.Ct. 434, 70 L.Ed.2d 492
        (1981). 8       
        Miller v.
        Johnson,
        515 U.S. 900, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2501(1995) (illustrating the political
        situation of disenfranchised blacks who Ahad no electoral influence, hence no muscle to
        lobby the legislature for change@),
        citing Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757, 88
        L.Ed. 987 (1944), Schnell v. Davis, 336 U.S. 933, 69 S.Ct. 749,
        93 L.Ed. 1093 (1949) (per curiam) (discriminatory application of voting
        tests);   Lane v.
        Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 59 S.Ct. 872, 83 L.Ed. 1281 (1939) (procedural
        hurdles);   Guinn v.
        United States, 238 U.S. 347, 35 S.Ct. 926, 59 L.Ed. 1340 (1915)
        (grandfather clauses). 9         
        Newport,
        Saad & Moore, Where America Stands (Wiley & Sons 1997),
        republished by the Gallup Organization at www.gallup.com/poll/faq.asp 10     
        Id. 
        Ronald K. Gaddie, Ph.D., Personal Conversation. 
        See also, Grasmick, H. & Bursik, R., Attitudes of
        Oklahomans Toward the Death Penalty, Center for the Study of Crime,
        Delinquency and Social Control (Univ. of Okla. 1988), at 13. 
        The Grasmick Study is attached to this application as Exhibit 6. 11     
        Id., at 590,
        113 S.Ct. at 2795. 12     
        Penry, 492 U.S. at 334-335, 109 S.Ct. at 2955. 
        Internal citations omitted. 13
            
        The IRSS
        website is www.irss.unc.edu/cgi-bin/POLL/search.link.cgi. 14     
        Harris Study
        No. 883006. 15         
        Capstone
        Poll,
        Institute For Social Science Research at the University of Alabama, IRSS
        Study NNSP-AL-017. 16     
        The
        California Poll,
        Field Institute, IRSS Study No. NNSP-CA-58. 17         
        Grasmick, H.
        & Bursik, R., Attitudes of Oklahomans Toward the Death Penalty, Center
        for the Study of Crime, Delinquency and Social Control (Univ. of Okla.
        1988), Exhibit 6 in the Appendix. 18     
        D.W. Keyes
        & W.J. Edwards, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: Current
        Status of Exemption Legislation 688 (ABA 1997), Table 1. 19         
        Lambert, 1999 OK CR 17 &
        10, fn. 19 (Opinion of Chapel, Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part) 20         
        Grasmick, H.
        & Bursik, R., Attitudes of Oklahomans Toward the Death Penalty,
        supra, note 17, at 47. 21     
        The mental
        age parameters for the survey question correspond to mentally retarded
        offenders such as Johnny Penry (mental age 6 2
        years), see Penry v. Lynaugh, supra;  Robert
        Lambert (mental age 8 years), see Lambert, supra, note 19;
        and William Alvin Francis (mental age 10 years), see Smith v.
        Francis, 474 U.S. 925, 926, 106 S.Ct. 260, 261 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
        dissenting)  .  See Appendix A
        to the Gaddie Survey, the Survey Instrument. 
        Professor Gaddie=s
        curriculum vita is Exhibit 4 to the Appendix of Exhibits. 22     
        The
        independent survey firm made 2,259 phone calls, obtaining a total of 794
        answers at the called residences.  Of
        those, 484 adult persons agreed to answer the survey, while 310 refused. 23           
        Gaddie Survey, Exhibit 5, at 1. 24     
        Id., at 3. 25         
        Grasmick
        & Bursik, Attitudes of Oklahomans Toward the Death Penalty,
        supra note 17, at 26. 26         
        Gaddie
        Survey,
        Exhibit 5, at 4.  The survey
        instrument did not list Adepends@
        as a choice for respondents.  Respondents
        whose answer depended on the particular facts were required to volunteer
        that response. 27     
        Id., at 4.  By comparison, the 1988 Gramsick/Bursik Study found that
        44.8% of respondents Astrongly
        favor@ capital punishment when the offender is 18, and
        only 25.8% favored capital punishment when the offender was under 16. 
        Gramsick & Bursik, supra, note 17, at 47. 28     
        Id., at 6. 29     
        Id., at 6-7.  The results of the Gaddie Survey also corroborate the
        observation of Gramsick and Bursik that Athe
        mental health of the offender has an even greater impact on support for
        the death penalty than does the offender=s age.@ 
        Gramsick & Bursik, supra, note 17, at 47. 30     
        Id., at 6-7. 31     
        Id., at 1. 32     
        The fact
        that Oklahoma has apparently not executed a 
        mentally retarded offender in the modern death penalty era and in
        almost ten years of active state executions would suggest that the
        punishment is Aunusual@ and thus forbidden under the state constitution,
        whether it is considered Acruel@
        by this Court or not. Okla. Const., Art. 2 '
        9 protects prisoners from cruel or unusual punishments and thus
        provides greater protection than the federal constitutional prohibition
        against Acruel
        and unusual punishments.  Lambert
        v. State, 1999 OK CR 17 & 15,  ___
        P.2d ___ (1999)(Chapel, J., concur in part and dissent in part) and
        fn. 30 thereof. 33     
        D. Keyes, W.
        Edwards & R. Perske, APeople with Mental Retardation are Dying, Legally,@   Mental
        Retardation, (Vol. 35 # 1, Feb. 1997), updated by the Death Penalty
        Information Center.  For a
        table of all inmates believed to be mentally retarded who were executed
        in the modern era of capital punishment (since 1976), see 
        www.essential.org/dpic/dpicmr.html 34         
        Ollman v.
        Evans,
        750 F.2d 970, 995-996 (1984)(en banc)(Bork, J., concurring).  35
            
        Cf. Buck
        v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 47 S.Ct. 584, 585 (1927). 
        In Buck, Justice Holmes upheld an involuntary
        sterilization statute with the observation that A[i]t
        is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate
        offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society
        can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their
        kind...Three generations of imbeciles are enough.@ 
        Justice
        Holmes= eugenic approach to the mentally retarded typified
        19th and early 20th century prejudice against the
        mentally retarded.  See
        City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 105
        S.Ct. 3249, 3266 (1985)(Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring
        in part and dissenting in part)(noting that in the late 19th
        and early 20th century A[a] regime of state‑mandated segregation and
        degradation [of the retarded] soon emerged that in its virulence and
        bigotry rivaled, and indeed paralleled, the worst excesses of Jim Crow. 
        Massive custodial institutions were built to warehouse the
        retarded for life;  the aim
        was to halt reproduction of the retarded and >nearly
        extinguish their race.=  Retarded
        children were categorically excluded from public schools, based on the
        false stereotype that all were ineducable and on the purported need to
        protect nonretarded children from them. 
        State laws deemed the retarded >unfit
        for citizenship=@).   36     
        D. Cole, Discretion
        and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal Justice
        Scholarship, 87 Georgetown L. J. 1059, 1060 (May, 1999) (noting that
        modern judicial expansion of substantive legal protections in the area
        of A...constitutional
        criminal procedure has an even more specific genesis in the need to
        protect those whom the political process will not protect@and
        reflects Aa
        heightened concern for those unlikely to find protection through the
        political process@).  |